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INTRODUCTION
In the Indonesian context, some would 
mindlessly say that “agama” refers to the 
six “official” religions of Islam, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Confucianism and in the same breath 
consider “agama” to be the equivalent in 
meaning to “religion” in general. Although 
we may be able to analyze “agama” in 
terms of other concepts, such as Judaism or 
communism, the use of “agama” implies 
that all Indonesians acknowledge and accept 
its official meaning, whether they belong to 
these six formalized religions or not.  Such a 
circumstance cries out for an explanation. 
In the past, to say that something was 
“agama” was not there simply to be found; 
the word “agama” does not occur in all 
ethnic societies in Indonesia. There is barely 
a vocabulary available in great numbers of 
ethnic languages in Indonesia for translating 
either “religion” or “agama” (Harahap, 2000; 
Kuper and Kuper, 2000: 914). These terms are 
foreign for some Indonesian ethnic groups.
It will be useful to look at the origin 
and the developments of the word “agama.” 
“Agama” is a loan word from Sanskrit: it 
is a “post-Vedic scripture conveying ritual 
knowledge that is considered to have been 
revealed by a personal divinity” (Merriam-
Webster’ Encyclopedia of World Religions, 
1999: 22). From a Srilankan context, “agama” 
rendered composite meanings: that “agama” 
is concerned with lokottara (supermundane) 
matters as opposed to laukoka (worldly) 
matters (Southwold, 1978). Presenting 
“agama” in its historical conditions obliges 
us to recognize its relativity against the 
deployment of “agama” in other societies, 
such as in Indonesia.
A mid-sixteenth century law text 
from Java  was  labeled The agama. In their 
study, M.C. Hoadley and M.B. Hooker 
refer to “agama” as “traditional learning 
(overgelevered leer) which could apply 
equally to any law book”, drawing particularly 
upon Hindu law following J. C. G. Jonker’s 
argument (Hoadley and Hooker, 1981: 57-
58). In this regard, “agama” is generally 
understood as a body of prescriptions. The 
meaning of “agama” shifted and there was 
already a binary relationship between the 
concepts of “agama” and “adat”: “agama” 
here refers to a ‘unified’ Javanese Court legal 
prescription as opposed to the diverse “adat” 
of local peripheries. This reasonable first crack 
would soon give way to the triadic sphere 
of “agama”, “adat” and “kepercayaan” 
discussed later. 
An interesting point is thatmajority 
of Indonesian Muslims do not associate 
“agama” with the Islamic notion of “din” 
or use the word. the word “din” refers 
to (1) custom or mores, (2) rules, (3) laws, 
(4) oneness of God, (5) obedience, (6) 
redemption, (7) judgment, (8) Armageddon, 
(9) advice, and (10) religion (‘Ulumul 
Qur’an, 1992: 48-50). As the biggest Muslim 
country in the world, the Indonesian word 
for “religion” is a word from Sanskrit, not 
Arabic. Whether the explanation for this 
partiality is cultural or ideological in nature, 
there is undoubtedly an element of each.
Ideologically, the appeal of some Islamist 
groups to an Islamic state has persistently 
incited the understanding of “din” al Islam 
not merely as a religion but also a state. The 
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principle of din wa dawlah creates a direct 
opposition to the ‘secular’ state embodied 
by both former colonial administrators 
and the Indonesian republic. One the other 
hand, cultural studies on how “agama” has 
been appropriated suggested that “agama” 
has affinity to including political as well as 
socio-cultural competitions for authority and 
domination.  
“Agama”, at first glance, more easily is 
associated with an exclusivist understanding 
of modern “religion” as referred to by 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1962) in The 
Meaning and End of Religion, made a prevalent 
study of the reification of “religion” and its 
logical consequence; modern understandings 
of “religion” are legitimated as an all-
encompassing concept and validated as 
final and inherent. The modern meanings of 
“religion” are used: (1) to refer to personal 
piety, (2) as an ideal and (3) as an empirical 
phenomenon. These usages refer to a 
public system. Within this understanding, 
“religion” as a noun has the plural form and 
the singular should use definite articles, and 
(4) as a total generic, ‘religion’ in general.     
He conveyed that “…in modern 
Indonesia agama, from the classical Sanskrit 
for ‘text’, has come to be used for the 
Western notion of a religion” (Smith, 1962: 
58-59). According to Smith’s assessment, our 
exposure to the “agama” by itself suffices to 
explain the “transposition” of the concept of 
“religion” to other parts of the world outside 
Greco-Roman Europe. Again, it is important 
to guard against a misunderstanding that 
this study would lead to a conclusion that 
“agama” is the result of a form of ‘religious/
cultural imperialism’. 
From an Indonesian point of view, 
Hadikusumo rationalizes the text and 
context of the definition of “agama” with 
its reference to Sanskrit. He states that “A 
means ‘not’ GAM means ‘go’. Suffix ‘a’ is 
to emphasize the eternal. AGAMA is then 
commonly understood as an eternal way 
of life.” (b) According to the ‘Sunarigama’, 
AGAMA was derived from A-GA-MA; A 
means empty or vacuum, GA means ‘place’ 
and MA means ‘the Sun’; Agama thus means 
the teaching of mystery, because God is 
located in a mysterious place, a vacuum or 
void …(c) Igama may reflect an abbreviation 
from the Sanskrit I-GA-MA, where the 
letter ‘I’  is ‘Iswara’, ‘GA’ is ‘body’ and MA 
is ‘Amartha’ (life); in this context, Igama 
means the teaching of kebatinan, spirituality 
(Hadikusumo, 1983: 16-17).
The problem here is not just a problem 
of transporting meanings from India to 
Indonesia. In fact, this paper discusses the 
extent to which propositions about “agama” 
as especially entailed in Indonesia’s system 
of government constitutes and is constituted 
by the Indonesian religious reality. I will 
apply Foucault’s notions of “history of the 
present” to the innovative ‘imaginative’ 
construction of the new system of production, 
distribution, circulation, and operation of 
the state-imposed “agama”. Through a 
methodological practice of archeology, this 
paper explores the ‘condition of possibility” 
for the emergence of “agama”. 
In this paper, I treat “agama” as the 
central issue and follow what Foucault has 
done:
“…to account the fact that is spoken about, 
to discover who does the speaking, the 
positions and viewpoints from which they 
speak, the institutions which prompt people 
to speak about it and which store and 
distribute the things that are said” (Foucault, 
1990: 16).
Here “agama” is considered not 
merely as a concept, butas a priori idea 
and knowledge that historically situated 
and contingent. Discourse refers to very 
specific ways of thinking, a constant manner 
of utterance considered acceptable by a 
particular discourse community. What is 
considered as “true” in this case “agama” is 
produced and sustained by state apparatus 
and/or a regime of truth such as Indonesian 
Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) 
(Love, 1989). The state apparatus and its 
fellows play by the rules of exclusion in which 
it draws the boundary of what is acceptable 
and what is not about “agama.”
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By focusing on “part of the ‘complex’ and 
‘restrictive’ exchange and communication in 
a particular system or culture”, it provides 
a way of exploring religious discourse as 
an element of ‘limitation’ and ‘exclusion’ 
practices within a culture (Foucault in 
Lemert, 1993). Precisely in this regard, this 
study of the discourse of “agama” is relevant 
to the project of understanding and changing 
the inequalities and suppression of religious 
minorities in Indonesia.  
I use this framework for the examination 
of religious legal provisions, ethnographic 
researches, and reports on practices of 
“agama” and its socio-political aspects, 
mostly from sources available only in Bahasa 
Indonesia and never before scrutinized with 
a view to their relevance for understanding 
contemporary religious discourse in 
Indonesia.
Later I propose that the influence of 
the discourse of “agama” is significant 
in informing the concept of Indonesian 
citizenry and that the formation of “agama” 
helped fashion a strategy of exclusion and 
containment of Indonesian minorities. How 
the discourse is produced and sustained, as 
we will discuss later, is related to the politics 
of exclusion: some people are disqualified 
from protection of Indonesian law based 
on a view that these people have no claim 
to sharing the rights those members of the 
six “official” religions enjoy as “legitimate” 
Indonesian citizens.
The common understanding about 
citizenship grants citizens legal status of 
political, social and cultural rights. It also 
sanctions citizens to participate in political 
institutions and processes, and it also 
supplies the source of identity (Kymlicka and 
Norman, 2000). The inclusion of citizenship 
in the discussion is to answer a philosophical 
critic of Foucault’s framework that “translates 
antagonism into difference” and the fact that 
the framework abandons the existing serious 
unequal power relations among citizens with 
different (religious) identities, this paper 
follows Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im who 
formulated citizenship as: 
“Citizenship...demonstrates affirmative and 
proactive rights of a pluralistic and inclusive 
political community which confirms and 
manages potential forms of ‘differences’ 
among the people and communities to 
ensure equal rights for all, disregarding 
their background in religion, sex, ethnicity 
or political affiliation” (An-Na’im, 2007: 69).
The discourse is clearly central to the 
state governance, because in many respects 
the state presence has been especially strong 
in the field of “agama”.  The convincing 
argument for this is that the state operation 
of “agama” becomes the key index of 
citizenship. A valid question for us may be: 
“what is the meaning of “agama” as informed 
by the state policies and how citizenship is 
reinforced or subverted by this meaning?” 
This question was inspired by Ton Salman’s 
article (Salman, 2004: 30).
Consider “agama” as something that 
we believe we already understand and 
that we actually know the word, then what 
surprising difficulty there is in endowing 
“agama” with a contextualized definition. 
This is made even more difficult because the 
discursive domain of “agama” is politics. So, 
the effort to put “agama” in perspective here 
is to answer the Foucauldian questions:  what 
kind of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged, unconscious modes of thought 
are written into, and often hidden within, 
“agama?” How has such discourse been able 
to operate in Indonesia from independence 
until today?
Situating the discourse as a formalized 
way of thinking of what “agama” is and what 
can be said about it is different from situating 
the discourse of “agama” in action. Because 
politics situate the discourse in action, we 
will discuss the politics of religions as well 
as the problem that arises when “agama” is 
appropriated in daily life. The discourse is 
clearly central to state governance, because 
in many respects the state presence has been 
especially present in the field of “agama”. 
The convincing argument for this is that the 
state operation of “agama” becomes the key 
index of citizenship. 
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DISCUSSION
 “Agama” in the shadow of the State
Early in the beginning of the Indonesian 
state, the moment Indonesian nationalists 
decided to declare Indonesian independence 
the constitutional makers had to immediately 
confront the issue of religion. The issue of 
the state’s foundation preceded the issue of 
democracy; whether or not the Indonesian 
state should be based on Islam and how the 
state should govern religious life trumped the 
question of the structure of the state should it 
be unitary or federal, and whether Indonesia 
should become a republic or a monarchy 
(Bolland, 1971).  
The conflict over the issue of state 
ideology was already brought before the 
meeting of the Badan Pemeriksa Usaha-usaha 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Japanese, 
Dokuritu Jiunbi Chosakai), a Japanese-
sponsored committee known as the 
Investigative Committee for the Preparation 
of Independence in late May and June 1945 
(Mudzhar, 1993: 24). The main purpose of 
the meeting was actually to determine the 
territorial boundaries to be claimed by an 
independent Indonesian state (Thoolen, 
1987: 36).
Indeed, the making of the Indonesian 
constitution demonstrated a commitment to 
regulate the cultural and religious diversity 
of Indonesian populations in mutual co-
existence. The Indonesian state adopted 
Pancasila as the state ideology and foundation. 
For many Indonesians, Pancasila reflects the 
ideals of tolerance under which the state 
gives official recognition to religious groups 
in Indonesia (Hidayah, 2009). But why did 
“agama” matter in the first place?
There are two ways to reconstruct the 
“condition of possibility” of “Agama”. The 
first is namely the People’s Assembly in 
which the discourse of “agama” was first 
established in 1952. That year The Ministry 
of Religions (formerly Kementerian Agama 
which later became the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs) proposed a restricted definition of 
“agama”. The idea was this: to be legitimated 
as an ‘official’ religion, a particular religion 
should have a prophet and a holy book, and 
also be acknowledged internationally. 
In 1961, the Ministry of Religion (Menteri 
Agama) again proposed the perimeter of 
“agama” as indicating equal validity as 
gestured in the previous propositions. 
“Agama” as authorized by the Indonesian 
state includes requirements that it (1) be 
an encompassing way of life with concrete 
regulations, (2) a teaching about the oneness 
of God; (3) include a holy book, which 
codifies a message sent down to prophet(s) 
through a holy spirit; and (4) be led by a 
prophet. The state views all religions outside 
these limitations as ‘tribal’ beliefs, and 
therefore are ‘superstitious’ within the 
working frameworks of this discourse.  With 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (Menteri Dalam 
Negeri) decree No. 477/74054 on November 
18th 1978, the government explicitly states that 
the religions ‘acknowledged’ in Indonesia are 
Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism 
and Buddhism. 
If we ask which reality obtained in these 
state propositions, we can respond that all 
Indonesians’ religious beliefs and practices 
are subject to them. It is important to observe 
that not all Indonesians were committed to 
this ordering. Thus “agama” as a ‘field of 
control’ has no parallel in pre-independence 
Indonesia. Even though according to 
Regeeringsreglement article 119, (1854), the 
Dutch ruler acknowledged the freedom 
of religions and pledged the government 
to a neutral position regarding religions, 
Indonesians have never experienced a 
‘secular’ governing system (Saidi, 2004: 34-
48). The Dutch went so far as forbidding 
Islamic instructions and providing incentives 
for Protestant missionaries (Noer, 1982). 
In the colonial era, regardless of the stated 
Dutch policy of neutrality and freedom of 
religions, religious policy was principally an 
Islamic policy, an Islam-centered policy of 
controlling religion (Steenbrink, 2006; Benda, 
1958).
A restricted understanding of 
“agama”that is devoid of a cultural and 
historical context has become the main 
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problem here. Hundreds of indigenous 
beliefs and practices, as well as many schools 
of interpretation within world religions 
(for example: Ahmadiah, Baha’i, Jehovah 
Witnesses) are not “legitimate” because these 
groups fall outside boundaries established 
within the discourse. Adding to this serious 
problem is that the New Order regime 
establishes the triadic discourse of “agama”, 
“adat” and “kepercayaan”. 
This complication has to do with the 
claim that addressing “agama” does not 
automatically exclude either “adat” or 
“kepercayaan” addressing them as the 
absolute others. Many religious beliefs and 
practices may not be clearly categorized 
as such. “Agama” reaffirms “adat” and 
“kepercayaan” while they also coexist in 
antagonism.  For that reason, the rhetoric of, 
for example, Aluk ta Dolo, Amatoa, Parmalim 
or Susila Budi that they are not “agama” is 
never culturally convincing.
From the perspective of the 
binaries of “agama”/“adat” and 
agama”/“kepercayaan”, “agama” gives 
almost no indication as to what Indonesians 
believe or practice. Instead, “agama” is 
situated within two other spheres: the 
politics of adatcommunities that transcends 
cultural diversities and the hegemony of 
monotheistic purity that averts Indonesian 
syncretistic cosmology. 
Following that reasoning, can we speak 
of “kepercayaan” if there is no “agama” in 
mind? Would it also be absurd if we speak 
of indigenous beliefs without knowingly 
adding “agama” in front of “adat” (to form 
the phrase “agama adat”)? Without the state’s 
interference, would it be possible, in a way, 
for “agama”, “adat” and/ or “kepercayaan” 
to exchange places?
At a political level, professing a religion 
is a political decision in Indonesia and 
a ‘legitimate’ religion may well identify 
citizenship. Focusing on the binary of 
“agama” and “kepercayaan”, the subsequent 
paragraphs will discuss the political effect 
of religious discourse in Indonesia. Here I 
will argue that the politics of religion is the 
most powerful force in forming the concept 
of “citizenship” in Indonesia. Essentially, 
Indonesian citizenship is given iussanguinis 
(either from an Indonesian father or mother, 
or both) and a partial ius soli (Indonesian 
Law No.26/2006). Arguing religion as the 
key index of citizenship, “religion” sets 
the boundaries of citizenship: only those 
professing ‘legitimate’ religions are to be 
considered as citizens. 
Here I propose that the discourse of 
“agama” is the key aspect in the constitution 
of the citizen subject. Within this operating 
framework, the state attempts to construct 
citizenry through the categorization and 
registration of citizen religious affiliation. 
To give an empirical grounding to this 
inquiry, I will use secondary reports and 
testimonials that extend the discussion on 
legal and bureaucratic procedures of civil 
administration in regards to “adat” and 
“kepercayaan”.
Negara Mawa Tata, Desa Mawa Cara: 
The state (city or court) has its rule, 
the villages their ways.
In a country where over 85% of its 
population is Muslim, Muslim citizens 
sought to establish the idea that religions 
other than Islam should be accorded 
legitimacyby the majority. Thiscan be 
traced back to the persistent efforts by 
Muslim factions to ‘define’ what “agama” 
is a position disregarding the constitutional 
prescription that “the national parliament 
does not privilege any particular religious 
community”. Muh.Dimyati, a member of 
the national parliament, pushed for a ban on 
aliran kepercayaan. 
The distinction between “agama” and 
“kepercayaan” was formulated according to 
the Ministry of Religion Decree No. 9/ 1952/ 
Article VI as ”A current of belief… a dogmatic 
opinion, which is closely connected to the 
living tradition of several tribes, especially of 
those tribes that are still backward. The core 
of their belief is everything which has become 
the customary way of life of their ancestors 
over time” (Supartha, 2004: 9). Accordingly, in 
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1953, the government acknowledged seventy 
two (72) aliran kepercayaan; these ‘alirans’, 
according to the Minister of Religions K. 
H. Masjkur, “in essence do not meet the 
prerequisite of “agama” (Driyarkara, 2007; 
Majalah Praba, 1953).
The effort to ‘define’ agama was so 
profound that a yearlater the Ministry of 
Religion reported that there were 360 ‘new 
agamas’ in Indonesia.   It was in 1954 that 
the Ministry of Religion set up Pengawas 
Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (PAKEM), 
a watchdog for the Ministry of Religion, to 
monitor and control aliran kepercayaan in 
Indonesia. Finally, in 1959, the parliament 
finally demanded a definition of “agama”. 
A committee under the Minister of 
Religion, Ahmad Wahid Wahab, specified 
prerequisites for the definition of “agama”: 
A holy scripture, a prophet, a belief in the 
absolute all-powerfulness of God and a 
system of law for its believers. 
In 1960 PAKEM was placed under 
the authority of the Attorney General 
(Kejaksaan Agung). Tap MPR No 2, 1960 
sanctified the definition of 1952 (God, 
holy book, and world acknowledgment). 
Again in 1961 the Minister of Religion 
restated the prerequisites for the definition 
of “agama” to exclude alirankepercayaan, 
and at this very moment the authority 
was given to the national military forces 
to ensure that the statute would be well 
enforced. In the State Police Primary Law 
(Undang-undang Pokok Kepolisian Negara) 
No. 13/ 1961, the Police are authorized to 
impose preventive and repressive acts to 
control aliran kepercayaan considered a threat 
to Indonesian populations.
All those defining debates brought 
to the surface valid tensions around 
what “agama” is. The pressure resulted 
in President [Soekarno]’s Decree No. 1/ 
1965 naming the six legitimate Indonesian 
religions Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and 
Confucianism. According to Ramstedt, 
Protestantism and Catholicism seen as two 
distinct religions in Indonesia is a legacy 
from the colonial period, especially from the 
‘pillarization’ (verzuiling) of Dutch society at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Pillarization 
“ensured that Catholics received equal 
political rights and representation in public 
life as well as within the Dutch Bureaucracy” 
(Ramstedt, 2004: 29). 
This does not mean that other religions 
such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, 
Taoism, etc, are prohibited in Indonesia. So 
long as their adherents do not need identity 
cards, marriage licenses, birth certificates, 
or passports—things that are impossible 
to do without in a modern state.  But this 
succeeded in abolishing all aliran kepercayaan 
from posing as “religions”. The response of 
this state of affairs, beginning with the failed 
attempted coup in 1965 andextending until 
1969, was that the army was busy eradicating 
aliran kepercayaan groups accused of being 
infiltrated by Communism, and religious 
differentiation within the terms of Indonesian 
citizenship was introduced (Hefner, 2001: 
35).
A compromise was reached for aliran 
kepercayaan to accommodate theirclaim 
to the status of “agama” in 1973 when 
parliament allowed various aliran 
kepercayaan, kebatinan and indigenous 
religious groups to function under the 
separate but equal status of kepercayaan 
kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa (the belief 
in the divine omnipotence) under the 
ministry of Education and Culture. State 
recognition of “kepercayaan” was articulated 
in Tap MPR RI No IV/MPR/1973 March, 22 
1973. 
It was an absurd compromise; according 
to the State, agama is defined as the belief 
in the divine omnipotence kepercayaan 
kepada Tuhan yang Maha Esa. According to 
the decision to relegate it to the status of a 
non-religion, an aliran kepercayaan can not 
even be queried as to whether it satisfies 
the prerequisites for “agama”. This, one 
may argue, is not a compromise at all. The 
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so-called ‘compromise’ was to put an end to 
the question of whether “kepercayaan” was 
religion.
A Minister of Home Affairs Decision 
(Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri) in 
November 1978 No. 477/74054, written in 
reference to the procedure for filling the 
“agama” section on the Citizens Identity 
Card, named only five recognized religions. 
Confucianism was thus excluded from 
the state’s recognition. This decision was 
annulled on March 21st 2000 by President 
Abdurahman Wahid, allowing Indonesians 
to include Confucianism as their religion 
on their identity cards.  In 2006 the House 
of Representatives passed the Citizenship 
Administration Law guarantee that 
every citizen, including those professing 
kepercayaan, “agama adat” or kebatinan, can 
claim their civil rights for the registration of 
notable occurrences such as marriage, death, 
and birth events. 
The law UU No. 23, 2006 grants 
acknowledged universal civil rights as stated 
in the verse 64, article 1 and 2 in which each 
Indonesian should register her/himself 
and for those whose religions are not yet 
acknowledged as “agama” or affiliated to 
alirans may leave the religious affiliation 
slot blank and their civil registration will be 
recorded.
The dispute over “agama” was 
broadened to include almost all aspects of 
citizens’ administration in Indonesia: marital 
registration, birth certificates, identity 
cards, religious education in public school, 
censorship and so on. And larger problems 
lurk over how to regard certain beliefs 
and ritual practices that fall outside the 
prerequisite of “agama” in Indonesia (Kipp 
and Rogers, 1987: 21).
Examinations of the state politics of 
identity and of programs of the Ministry 
of Religious affairs are some of these 
considerations. The politics of defining 
“religion” is one thing and the social reality 
is another. There can be no sense to the idea 
that “kepercayaan” and “agama” are in a 
clear distinction constraining the syncretic 
nature of daily practices ‘out there’. There are 
multiple articulations of religious pluralism, 
not only the diversity of so called (world) 
religions, but also the contesting different 
ideologies, traditions, and understandings 
within a given religion.  In order to fully 
understand how “agama” functions in an 
Indonesian context, we had better extend 
the discussion to the practice of governing 
citizens in various local communities.
The issue of identity is interesting here. 
Whereas Indonesians’ indigenous religions 
are predisposed to facilitate narrow identities 
based on primordial allegiances, (world) 
religions endorse a broader identity based on 
a shared unitary state-imposed orthodoxy. 
This is one reason why the politics of identity 
is so complex in Indonesia; a member of an 
adat community must comply with often 
conflicting regulations in ministries such 
as the Ministry of Forestry, Home Affairs, 
Human Resources and Transmigration, as 
well as the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
The ‘identity’ problem does not always refer 
solely to the administrative mechanism of 
citizenship. For example, for more than 
thirty years, some Indonesians and especially 
adat communities have been labeled as 
Communists (Webb and Farram, 2005). 
When the Communist Party was 
outlawed in 1966 so were people who 
had been ‘granted’ labels as Communists. 
The ‘communist’ label was constructed as 
synonymous with ‘atheist’ in order to create 
popular acceptance of the judgment that 
communists were not only a threat to the 
liberal state, but were also the latent enemy 
of conservative religious people in Indonesia. 
The issue of communism involved the state 
through the army, for instance, forcefully 
monitoring the self-identity of members of 
the adat communities.  The communist purge 
was not just a ‘struggle for power to govern’ as 
goes the jargon within political frameworks, 
but was also a systemic ‘genocide’ of many 
religious communities in Indonesia. 
There are probably no institutions 
capable of exercising stronger social control 
than world religions andstate apparatus. 
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Religious elites and the State apparatus elites 
in Indonesia, according to Daniel Dhakidae 
(2003), are involved in a ‘fellowship of 
discourse’. Within the fellowship of discourse 
the state elites and thoseof world religions, 
especially of Islam, are capable of exercising 
the politics of exclusion in at least two ways. 
First, the State’s recognition only of 
(world) religions is an intentional exclusion 
of hundreds of native religious belief systems 
in Indonesia. 
Secondly, in connection with the state’s 
recognition, religion in one way or another 
creates an entry barrier so as to encourage 
or discourage other claimants to the status of 
“religion”. Entry barriers for religions other 
than the six recognized religions are manifest 
in the state’s limiting financial support and 
labeling tribal religions as “animist” in official 
documents, including in the constitution and 
the decisions of the national parliament. 
An example is the Presidential Decree No. 
14 (1967) of the Prohibition of the Public 
Practice of Chinese Religions and Customs 
which says that this decree was introduced to 
protect Indonesian citizens from “unnatural 
influence on the psychology, mentality, and 
morality” of Chinese religions, beliefs and 
customs (Suryadinata, 1998).
Because religion is so important in 
national affairs, there are many different 
agencies involved with it, and each one 
has its own hierarchy of bureaucrats who 
together constitute formidable entry barriers. 
In cooperation with the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is 
responsible for the recognition of religions 
in Indonesia. The army and the Attorney 
General with its PAKEM constitute yet other 
entry barriers (Dhakidae, 2003: 554-560).
The issue of citizenship has become the 
currency of the Indonesian state. Citizenship 
is sometimes conflated with one’s given 
‘nationality’, an abstract notion narrowly 
grasped by Indonesians, especially those 
who live in remote adat communities areas. 
The new subjection inscribed in the politics 
of religions creates and legitimates a new 
subject not as a carrier of rights, but of norms 
(social consent through hegemony) rather 
than mere legal regulation.
Until recently, gaining religious 
citizenship from positive legal documents 
was a problematical undertaking. Civil 
courts may grant citizenship status, but 
only after extensive deliberation from the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and local administration 
offices. Practically, even the effort to name 
a “religion” on an Identity Card presents an 
uncanny predicament. It has been a common 
situation that when citizens apply for an 
Identity Card, by entering “Confucianism” 
in the space specifying “Religion” on the 
application form, it would usually appear on 
the card itself as “Buddhism” (Yang, 2005). 
So it has been for the Baha’is, whose card 
would mysteriously list “Hinduism”. And 
for the latest electronic ID card, those who 
profess “kepercayaan” should leave empty 
the “Religion” space. The Identity card begs 
the question concerning our discussion of 
religious discourse in Indonesia. In 1951, 
the Soekarno government introduced the 
Identity Card.  After the government defined 
a citizen’s identity, Indonesians had to have a 
fixed, i.e. unchangeable, identity. 
From the experience of Javanese, 
who constitute more than forty percent of 
Indonesians, a ‘fixed’ religious affiliation was 
relatively rare as was a ‘fixed’ name. Javanese 
have a ‘childhood name’ and a ‘mature’ 
name. Some have a completely different 
name or just add ‘religious name’ after 
reaching a certain stage of maturity, usually 
marked by marriage. Changing names is also 
a usual occurrence when the original name is 
considered ‘bad’; that is, when the name does 
not suit someone’s personality or is perceived 
to bring misfortune. Religious affiliation was 
a matter of ‘natural changes’. We can turn to 
Andrew Beatty on his study of Slametan ritual 
to give an Eastern Javanese context.
“The very adaptability of the slametan has 
made conversion from Islam to Hinduism 
and sometimes back again less troublesome 
than one might imagine. As a ritual frame 
adaptable to diverse faiths and ideologies, it 
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remains at the heart of Javanese religion. As 
an example of religious syncretism, it shows 
how and with what inventive grace people 
can come to terms with their differences” 
(Beatty, 1999).
On a different level of analysis, the 
religious discourse into “agama” and “adat” 
offers a different level of binary pairs based 
on the fundamental principle that “adat” is 
not ‘religious’, and that “adat” is the ultimate 
expression of culture. The State imposes 
the demarcation of “adat” from “religion” 
as a control mechanism. Considered as 
hindering nationalistic and progressive 
ideals, “adat” is preserved as an object of 
nostalgia and tourism. Next I will extend the 
inquiry into consequences of the discourse of 
“agama” in Indonesia. It presents a religious 
narrative drawn from ethnographies of adat 
communities in Indonesia. The purpose being 
is to provide a sociological translation of the 
appropriation of “agama” in the modern 
Indonesian state.
The State has It’s Rule, Villages their 
Ways
The Indonesian government has 
deliberately placed “adat” within the 
cultural sphere, distinguishing it as separate 
from other elements of adat communities’ 
cosmology, especially those involving belief 
systems. In so doing, the government imposes 
“adat” as “a gloss for allegedly immutable 
cultural forms that are held to distinguish 
one collectivity, such as a village or ethnic 
group, from another” (Spyer, 1996: 28). The 
assumption that “adat” is immutable has 
always been the grounds for discouraging 
adat communities from participating in the 
processes of Indonesian politics, economics, 
education, and other compartmentalized 
“modern progress”.
The government’s stance toward “adat” 
also reflects the institutionalized concept of 
the colonial Dutch administrators. Patricia 
Spyer (1996: 28) examines the genealogy of 
“adat” and comes to the deduction that “adat” 
is “clearly developed within the historical 
context of a complex interaction between 
Dutch hegemonic ambitions, colonial 
practice of rule (or divide and rule), foreign 
religions, and the political affiliations that 
ordered the population of the Malay region 
along religious and ethnic lines.” The native 
populations were segregated between those 
who were adat subjects, Muslims, Christians, 
oriental descendant subjects, etc all subjects 
who were not to interact with each other. This 
reasoning is important; as a result the Dutch 
constructed “adat” and “agama” (Islam) as 
antagonistic opposites.
Indonesian governments, especially 
during the Soeharto regime, established 
a firm visionthat the Republic is an 
‘indigenous’ state all Indonesians are equally 
indigenous (asli) (Li, 2000). Populations 
living in the former Netherland East Indies 
territory were automatically Indonesian 
citizens. Except those who had no rights of 
citizenship or had double citizenship because 
of the different Indonesian nationality laws 
that are entirely based on ius soli (similar to 
the Netherlands) while other states apply the 
ius sanguinis principle, such as the People’s 
Republic of China, Japan, and India, which 
have been the State of origin of many 
Indonesian ‘foreign descendants’. This idea 
epitomizes the Soeharto government’s (and 
other presidencies) policy of not officially 
employing ethnicity (and race) in government 
discourses. Ethnicity is not marked on the 
citizens identity card, no official body exists 
for dealing with ethnic groups or race (which 
exist in Malaysia, Vietnam or United States), 
and there are no separate laws affecting 
various different ethnic groups. However, 
there are multiple departments and rulings 
dealing with remote tribal communities and 
religious affairs.
Thomas A. Reuter has put the point 
vividly in his study of Bali Aga, in Custodians 
of the Sacred Mountain.  Bali Aga practices 
its own form of Hinduism within Hindu Bali. 
In the broader context of religious discourse, 
Reuter cites the most recent and invasive 
intervention of the state as having created 
serious ruptures in the Bali Aga community. 
Reuter agrees that the politics of “agama” 
and “adat” facilitate state interference in 
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almost all adat communities in Indonesia. 
The state policy in Bali Aga is manifested 
in state institutions such as Badan Pelaksana 
Pembina Lembaga Adat (the Executive Body 
of Adat Institutions Administration) and 
Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (Indonesian 
Hindu Dharma Council). (Reuter, 2005: 423). 
These executive bodies have the prerogative 
to impose changes on adat organizations all 
over Bali: in the case of Bali Aga this body 
forced the klianadat, anormative assembly for 
the Balinese mainstream, to replace uluapad, 
a distinctive adat assembly of eight ‘pairs of 
elders’ in the Bali Aga community. 
The greatest antagonism from Bali Aga 
toward ‘national’ religious policy can be 
seen in their refusal of meru and padmasana. 
Meruis a tall pura with an ascended roof, 
and padmasana is a stone throne for Sang 
HyangWidhi, the highest Hindu god according 
to the Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia, 
responding to the state requirement that 
only monotheist faiths can be recognized as 
“agama” (Reuter, 2005: 98). The mandatory 
requirement that all ritual should be led by 
Brahmana priests is a tremendous problem 
for the Bali Aga community, which has not in 
the past attached much importance to a caste 
system. Reuter implicitly argues that for the 
Bali Aga community, “agama” cannot be 
separated from “adat” in the way that such 
separation is expected by the state as in the 
case of ‘the pairs of elders’ that symbolize the 
unity of the secular and the religious (Reuter, 
2005: 327-336).
A similar case has been made for the 
Tengger community of East Java. Robert 
W. Hefner had a similar point of departure 
in studying the Tengger of East Java: their 
ritual. Hefner refuted the arguments that 
the Tengger community is an ethnic enclave 
separate from the larger Javanese ethnic-
group. However, the distinctive characteristic 
of Tengger ritual was that it was always 
conducted in a formal liturgy performed by a 
specific kind of village priest. The survival of 
the Tengger priesthood, found nowhere else 
in modern Java, emphasized the uniqueness 
of Tengger tradition (Hefner, 1985: 8).
Hefner elucidated the tradition with 
“adat” as a starting point. Hefner stated 
that “adat” is often posed in opposition to 
“agama” and that the distinctive characteristic 
of “adat” which, at least according to him, 
comes from an orthodox Muslim point of 
view is limited by an understanding that “the 
belief and practices to which it refers are not 
divinely inspired” (Hefner, 1985: 37). In this 
discussion, Hefner does not conclude that 
adat is “secular” in opposition to “agama,” the 
religious. Rather, he argues that because of the 
variation of adat from region to region, adatis 
quite different from agama. Further Hefner 
argues that “the complex history of adat 
makes it difficult to hypostatize the cultural 
content of adat throughout Indonesia” and 
that the substance of adat is not an assortment 
of a-historic and immutable “traditional 
customs” (Hefner, 1985: 38). Elaboration on 
the differences between adat and religion are 
best articulated in Hefner’s words: “…it is 
difficult to argue that any one set of traditions 
is inherently superior to another except when 
one is talking about what is best for one’s own 
community” (Hefner, 1985: 38). Relativistic 
but grounded legitimatizations are things 
“agama” could not provide in a plural world 
of diverse tradition and cultural differences 
in Indonesia.
As in the case of Bali Aga, the Tengger 
community is in “the politically awkward 
position of professing a faith not recognized 
as legitimate” by the state (Hefner, 1985: 
41). Even though the, partly state-initiated, 
movement for Tengger affiliation with 
Balinese Hinduism had already begun in 
the 1950’s, Tengger’s self-proclamation of 
Javanese Hinduism (sometimes the case 
is more confused with the native words of 
“Buda Tengger”) has made affiliation with 
Balinese Hinduism very thorny to this day.
The State’s policy that every citizen 
should profess one of the six recognized 
religions has resulted in Tengger self-
identification as Hindu increasing 
significantly, from eight to sixteen villages 
(Hefner, 1985: 239). Interestingly, Hefner 
argues that the driving force for Hindu 
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affiliation was not “the collapse of traditional 
beliefs as to the nature of the supernatural, 
but the problem of self-definition and 
legitimatization posed by increased 
involvement in an Indonesian society in 
which Islam is the dominant religious 
idiom.” This is an interesting account since 
many descriptions tend to conclude that 
Tengger affiliation with Hinduism is a 
romanticized sentiment, as it is absent of 
“authentic Tenggerness” (Nuruddin and 
Deden F, 2003; Nurkhoiron and Waluyo, 
2005).
Hefner discussed the religious life of 
the Tengger in the context of Islamization 
and the penetration of modernist Hinduism 
(Parisada Hindu Dharma version) in the 
region (Bruinessen, 1999: xxxii). Hefner 
implied that Tengger Parisada is better 
viewed as a guardian of priestly ritual 
tradition rather than as a reformer, compared 
to its Balinese counterpart. We may assume 
that Hefner’s statement is true only if we 
ignore the missionary movement after 1962, 
when some village leaders (kepala desa) 
invited government superiors to witness a 
formal declaration identifying the Tengger 
as a Hindu society (Hefner, 1985: 250). After 
1962, Parisada sent Balinese-trained Hindu 
teachers to Tengger. The most notable change 
in Tengger was the erection of Balinese-
inspired Hindu Pura (temple) in the Poten 
area, a place where the village priest had 
normally led the Tengger’s traditional ritual 
prior to 1996.
While Hefner refutes the ‘repression 
hypothesis,’ there were two contradictory 
decisions from Parisada Hindu Dharma 
Indonesia (PHDI) relevant here. The first was 
letter No. 00/SK/PHDI-Jatim/ 1973 on the 
establishment of PHDI in ProbolinggoDisrict, 
which included the Tengger. Another letter, 
No. 00/PHDI-Jatim/Kept/73, on March 6th, 
1973 categorized the Tengger community 
as Buddha Mahayana. In yet another 
account prior to 1973, in 1968 a handful of 
‘researchers’ visited the Tengger, and in a 
short visit, those ‘researchers’ decided that the 
Tengger community was basically a Hindu 
community (Nurkhoiron and Waluyo, 2005). 
Such differing categorizations of so basic an 
element of identity were not unique to these 
two communities.
Look at the case of Tobaku studied by 
Lorraine V. Aragon. The Field of the Lord is a 
study of a Christian mission and its influence 
on the modern Tobaku community. Aragon 
thus argues that the picture of the mission 
and its project of modernization “has been 
a government policy of economic expansion 
and enforced nationalism as much as a policy 
of selective religious intervention” (Aragon, 
2000: 24). According to her account, the state 
has a different rhetoric for realizing its goals. 
Not of “agama” and “kepercayaan”, but of 
“agama” vs. “adat”.
This argument is intimately familiar 
through the writing of Ann Schiller. In 
Schiller’s analysis of the Ngaju people, she 
portrayed the southern Borneo peoples in the 
past as professing a “private ecstatic religious 
practice in an array of kin group-centered 
rituals.” It was only after the state’s intrusion 
into religious policy, in the mid 1950’s, that the 
indigenous belief system and practices were 
given a name Kaharingan (Schiller, 1996: 412). 
In the former times, within this 
indigenous belief system, the high god was 
perceived as not actively participating in 
human affairs. Most rituals and prayers were 
directed at ‘middle’ supernatural beings 
including ancestors and guardian spirits. 
Schiller’s statements resonate with Rita S. 
Kipp and Susan Rodger’s assessment that 
“local rituals in many ethnic homelands may 
not have been conceptualized as components 
of a distinctive and systemic domain (Kipp 
and Rodgers, 1987: 3).
The ‘high god’ aspect has often been 
emphasized in the ‘monotheistic’ discourses 
of Indonesians. Quoting Schärer’s study 
via Joseph Weinstock (Kipp and Rodgers, 
1987: 78) on Kaharingan, the Ngaju version of 
Kaharingan acknowledges the spirit multitude 
and notes that the high God does not play a 
major part in the life of the Ngaju peoples, yet 
Weinstock ignores the relative insignificance 
of the monotheistic aspect of Kaharingan. The 
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issue of monotheism is a pervasive issue 
since the belief in an all-embracing God is the 
sine qua non of Indonesian ideology. 
The rhetoric of “agama” has also been 
internalized successfully in public Ngaju 
consciousness. The religious body of the 
Union of Kaharingan Dayaks of Indonesia 
initiated codification of Kaharingan belief 
and practice approximating the doctrine and 
creeds of world religions, especially Islam 
and Christianity: sermons were modeled on 
the Bible, recitation of the ‘five pillars of faith’ 
resembles those of Islamic “imans”, ritual 
modeled the posture adopted by Balinese 
Hindus and, of course, the prominence of the 
notion of a supreme Deity (Schiller, 1996: 414).
Examination of adat in the colonial 
context by John R. Bowen in Law, Equality 
and Islam in Indonesia (2003) provides a few 
brilliant insights. The Dutch stance on adat by 
and large was motivated, he insisted, by fear 
of the potentially unifying force of Islam in 
the Dutch East Indies (Aragon, 2000: 160).
In the course of the nineteenth century, 
the colonial system was based on, according 
to Bowen, legal pluralism. Europeans in the 
Dutch East Indies abided by the civil and 
criminal code as it was in the Netherlands, but 
the native populations had separate courts. 
Perhaps well to consider is how different 
courts were related to racial separation in the 
Dutch East Indies. Religion did matter for 
racial separation; prior to regeeringsreglement 
article 119, the Dutch East Indies natives 
professing Christianity could be included as 
European according to Algeemene Bepaling 
van Wetgeving (Ketetapan Umum Perundang-
undangan). 
Since the division was provocative for 
native Muslims, the colonial administrator 
later changed the category to be based on 
racial characteristics: European, Chinese 
and Eastern Asia descendants, Arabs and 
Southern Asia descendants, and in the 
bottom of the hierarchy were the native Indies 
pribumi. Based on racial separation, the Dutch 
colonial established Kantoor voor Inlandsche 
Zaken (the Office of Natives’ Affairs) (Saidi, 
2004: 34-35).
This racial separation was separated 
from legal pluralism, since the courts were 
appointed according to this racial division. 
The native Indonesians were submitted to 
nineteen adat law jurisdictions, adat recht, 
whose jurisdictions were, according to 
legal experts, limited to the native pribumi. 
This was when adat became a binding legal 
system; adat law ceased as a mechanism for 
maintaining the harmony and balance of the 
society and universe. Adat sanction was then 
used as positive law, to punish criminals 
and violations of civil order and to segregate 
different ethnic groups (Aragon, 2000). Since 
then, the commands of the ancestors became 
prescriptive and isolative laws.
Bowen assessed that the changed 
‘function’ of adat was a creation of colonial 
authorities. The colonial authorities created 
native adat ‘institutions’ to effectively 
govern the native population. In brief, Dutch 
administrators, (and some anthropologists in 
this regard), “developed a science of Indies 
adatrecht…to systemize administration, to 
produce laws for the natives, to study local 
culture, and to keep Islamic law at bay” 
(Bowen, 2003: 46).
Bowen elucidated the relation of adat 
law, Islamic jurisdiction and colonial legal 
law in his chapter of “Remapping Adat”. 
Important to note here is “that colonial 
adat law was intended to be not just a set of 
administrable rules” (Bowen, 2003: 48). but 
also a charge against the idea of a ‘public 
role of Islam’. Within Hurgronje’s famous 
systematization, law was seen as the very 
aspect in which Islam was perceived ‘to have 
lost touch with the real world’: “Islam was 
not located anywhere, and thus could be 
said to have no social or cultural existence” 
(Bowen, 2003: 51).
Here Bowen makes clear how 
the discourse around adat was used to 
undermine Islam. The polarization of “adat” 
and “agama” which was really a polarization 
of “adat” and “Islam” was established. The 
fundamental political consideration for the 
colonial administrator was how to preserve 
political distinctions among groups of 
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people as contained in varieties of adat law 
(Bowen, 2003: 50). To undermine Islam, 
according to Bowen, colonial administrators 
were informed that the nature of adat codes 
were equally descriptive and prescriptive, 
colonial administrators were conditioned to 
see adat as ‘eminently subject to empirical 
verification’; “the prescriptive had no source 
other than practice or habit, and thus relied on 
their descriptive accuracy.” Thus, “under the 
conception of adat, a rule loses its normative 
force and its legal standing” including rules 
from of Islamic law. 
In Bowen’s analyses, Dutch adat law is 
the root of and the model for New Order non-
legal representations of Indonesian ‘unity in 
diversity’. In the reign of the Soeharto regime, 
adat was seen as the ‘highest point of material 
culture’ (puncak-puncak tertinggi kebudayaan 
nasional): marriage customs, dances, clothes, 
house styles, etc, one of each province, is best 
illustrated in Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. 
The New Order adat-as-culture and the Dutch 
legacy of adat-as-law are a duality within 
which adat was both uprooted from the socio-
cultural context of particular societies and 
detached from its religious aspect.
The New Order government contains 
religious discourse only within the six 
recognized religions. Thus, accommodating 
most recognized world religions requires 
radical changes in the meaning and function 
of elements of local adat, in both religious 
and material aspects. The New Order policy 
in this discussion is best illustrated by the 
1985 Cultural Policy that “care is taken that 
destructive superstitions are not tolerated 
in these local beliefs. All local groups must 
have a belief in God (Soebadio, 1985: 13-14). 
Due to the strength and endurance of this 
perceived contradiction between traditional 
‘superstitions’ and religion, many local 
[material] cultures often no longer possess 
their original religious function. 
To be clear, Geertz assessed adat in an 
understanding that “adat” means “something 
half-way between ‘social concensus’ and 
‘moral style’…” (Geertz, 1983). One problem 
which bedevils a sensible discussion  of 
“adat” is, in Geertz’s view,  the reductive 
interpretation of adat to habit a kind of 
routine where it is reduced to practice found 
in everyday life. As a consequence, “adat” 
by definition was understood wrongly as ‘a 
set of traditional rules traditionally applied 
to traditional problems’. Here the mischief is 
exaggerated by the State’s aggressive policy 
of promoting modernization. In the New 
Order legacy, adat was no longer relevant 
in modern times, neither culturally or 
religiously.
In the same light, consider Jane Monnig 
Atkinson. Atkinson noted that “agama” 
actually covers a somewhat narrower 
range than it does in the English translation 
“religion” (Kipp and Rodgers, 1987: 21). 
In the Indonesian state context, religion’s 
meaning very much overlaps with “adat”, 
yet at the same time “religion” in a narrower 
definition claims opposition against “adat”. 
The rigid dichotomy of “agama” and “adat” 
is repeatedly differentiated by the level 
of abstractness. Many traditional societies 
provide good support that there were initially 
cohesive systems of life. For this reason, “the 
perceptual dichotomy of adat and agama 
while not necessarily distinct in the minds 
or lives of the people is very real and critical 
to the functioning of the State” (Kipp and 
Rodgers, 1987: 74).
An exceptionally brief account from R. 
Schifold on the Mentawai people and Sven 
Cedderoth on the Sasak community will 
illustrate governmental policies regarding 
the religions of adat communities:
“Adat community hardly corresponds to the 
image of national Indonesian personality, 
and everything was undertaken to adapt 
them to it as soon as possible. In 1954 a 
decree was promulgated prohibiting their 
traditional religion, which was said to be 
heathen; all the inhabitants were given three 
months to decide whether they wanted 
to [sic!] Christianity or to Islam. Anyone 
who did not choose within this period 
was threatened with punishment by the 
police or by mission teachers, and his ritual 
equipment was burned. Coupled with this 
were governmental measures to turn the 
longhouses that lay at irregular intervals 
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along the rivers into tidy, surveyable villages 
with a church and a school. At the same 
time, external features such as glass-beaded 
jewelry, the long hair of the men, loin cloths, 
tattoos, and the custom of chiseling the 
incisors to a point were forbidden as marks 
of un-Indonesian primitiveness” (Schifold, 
1998).
Sven Cedderoth affirmed a similar case 
from Lombok. On May 2, 1967, two years after 
the 1965 coup de etat attempt, one village of the 
Sasak community received an announcement 
that the government had decided the five 
officially recognized religions (Islam, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism and 
Hinduism) and that everyone had to belong 
to one of these religions. They were urged 
to choose one of these official recognized 
religions within three months. The women 
were not asked to register their choice. Three-
quarters chose Buddhism, others Islam. The 
Ministry of Religions apparatus assigned 
Parisada Hindu Dharma (the Council of Hindu 
Dharma Indonesia) to set an inauguration. 
The signed lists were given to civil, military 
and police authorities. Fifty out of 500 who 
had listed themselves as Buddhists attended 
the inauguration, and many of them “felt that 
they had by way of a detour been made Hindus 
rather than Buddhists” (Cedderoth, 1996).
In Cedderoth’s account, the ‘politics of 
religion’ in Lombok included the burning 
of the syncretic watutelu mosque; the 
destruction of the sacred sanctuary including 
lingam-yoni; and the addition of religious 
education classes; the publication of a book 
about watutelu as aliran kepercayaan, as well 
as various missionary works from Muslim 
organizations such as Nahdlatul Wathan and 
Muhammadiyah (Bartholomew, 2002) and 
Wali Umat Buddha Indonesia (the Councils 
of Indonesian Buddhists). Theravada 
Buddhist monks sere also sent during this 
period (Avonius, 2004; Cedderoth, 1996).
By having members of the Sasak 
community choose a religion from the menu 
of five acceptable faiths, the putative citizen’s 
‘rights’ were ‘granted’. The destruction of 
a mosque and sanctuary underlined the 
State’s ability to enforce this policy and the 
potential violence of which it was capable. A 
promising line of arguments was proposed 
by Koentjaraningrat (1993: 9), the one who 
established Indonesian anthropology, that 
the politics of tribal religions in Indonesia 
sustains several purposes. 
First, it segregated the two most 
important governments in Indonesia. 
Soekarno recognized the value of Marxism for 
Indonesia, while Soeharto strongly opposed 
Communism and regarded Communists as 
Atheists and later labeled Communism the 
worst ideology in Indonesia. 
Second, this policy shifted the 
confrontation field among major religions 
in Indonesia. The hostilities between Islam 
and Christianity about “conversion” and 
the construction of places of worship were 
then projected to target ‘non-religious’ 
Indonesians. The dispersed attentions 
directed to potential memberships are 
designed to maintain the harmony of the 
majority. 
Third, the Soeharto government endorsed 
the missionary projects in the masyarakat 
adat areas with the assumption that the 
government indirectly was also ‘contributing’ 
to the ‘progress’ of the ‘uncivilized’.  
Fourth, Soeharto’s government believed 
that hundreds of the religions of masyarakat 
adat threatened the government’s political 
sovereignty, especially those religions with 
messianistic and populistic projects.
Understanding the function of “agama” 
as a means of containment, the New Order 
succeeded in inhibiting ‘Islamic-political’ 
groups and pinning down their political 
influence. The “sole-ideological-foundation 
(Pancasila sebagai Asas Tunggal)” policy 
imposed by New Order in Indonesia (1984) 
forced many Islamic parties and associations 
to change or to dissolve their organizations. 
Many political struggles motivated by 
Islamic sentiments have been suppressed 
in the name of ‘national security’. The 
Christians have been contained in the form 
of a capitulation under the ‘joint decision’ 
between the Minister of Religious Affairs, the 
Minister of Education, and/or the Minister 
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of Home Affairs in religious education, the 
construction of place of worship, etc.
With special reference to the deployment 
of “agama”, we are now to get a different 
picture of the politics of religions in Indonesia; 
the transnational religious movements. 
Faced with the hardened relationship 
between the globalized groups and the 
‘mainstream’ religious groups, the whole 
discourse of “agama” again tends to appear 
as the dominant paradigm of government. 
Policy regarding the Ahmadiyah, the 
Jehovah Witnesses, Wahabi, Syiah, Sai Baba, 
Hare Krishna, Baha’i still is still derived 
from the working operation of “agama.” 
An examination of who appropriates 
the “agama” reveals a division clear in 
principle, but hazier in fact; that “agama” 
is a ‘field of power’ in Bourdieuan sense, a 
multidimensional space of possible positions 
for the state and citizens.
CONCLUSION
The underlying, simple conclusion of 
this paper is that the definition of “agama” is 
not only used to categorize phenomena and 
objects, but it also creates the things defined 
(Lambek, 2000). The Indonesian state defines 
agama in a restricted manner that it (1) be 
an encompassing way of life with concrete 
regulations, (2) a teaching about the oneness 
of God; (3) include a holy book, which 
codifies a message sent down to prophet(s) 
through a holy spirit.
 The matter of concern here is that the 
accepted statements about “agama” limit the 
boundary of what can be said about “agama” 
and what cannot. The discursive domain 
of this construction is politics, in which the 
dominant subjects are the state apparatus. 
As Foucault rightly stated, the discourse is 
produced by the power/knowledge regime 
or regime of truth which follows the rule of 
exclusion that determines what discourse is 
allowed, and the mechanism and procedures 
to produce and maintain the discourse and to 
decide who has the right to speak. 
The discourse of “agama” has 
been repeatedly used as a strategy of 
marginalization, a way of scaling down 
the political rights of “Others” (Peterson 
and Wolf, 2002: 7). The constitution makers 
eliminated the diverse and multifaceted 
forms of religious life in Indonesia to regulate, 
standardize and operate the nationalistic and 
even patriotic religious practice and belief 
the agama. The divisive aspect of a state-
sponsored definition of “agama” further 
becomes the strategy of political control. 
The state definition of “agama” segregates 
“kepercayaan” and “adat” from what is 
regarded as customary and labels it as 
superstitious or tribal in order to underplay 
their meanings in social and political life. 
 “Agama” is also the best measure to 
‘contain’ the ‘un-nationalist’ minority the 
Chinese, the ‘separatists’, the ‘communists’, 
the ‘fundamentalists’. Once again, religion 
is the sphere where the Confucians, the 
Ahmadis, the Baha’is, the Budi Luhur 
members are fully controlled by the 
government. All citizen documentation 
specifies religion, except the passport. These 
minorities not only have to struggle over their 
rights to believe and practice their religion, 
but also their citizenship. 
These are obviously examples of a flawed 
administration of religious affairs. The state 
appropriation of “agama” has been the main 
tool to control its citizens. The Indonesian 
state creates and recreates the discourse of 
“agama” as the main method to demonstrate 
state power “agama” is derived from the very 
‘construction’ of the state: the state presents in 
the society through the creation, distribution, 
and operation of the discourse of “agama”. 
Disciplinary regulations and categorization 
of citizens’ religious affiliation are examples 
of the state “identifying” citizens.
The constitutional writing processes 
and state religious policy-making gave 
illustrations of how Abrahamic faiths and 
institutions are both “agama” and above 
“agama”. Abrahamic religions (especially 
Islam) are the condition for “agama”, yet, 
“Abrahamic” religions are above agama 
because state-sponsored definitions about 
“agama” are relevant only for those 
137
Sita Hidayah -- The Politics of Religion
The Invention of “Agama” in Indonesia
considered as ‘inferior’ in beliefs and 
practices. Defining “agama” is a naming 
practice, to give a name to the others.
The problem here does not depend on 
there actually being citizens that have been 
able to come to terms with the discourse 
of “agama”.  But the establishment of the 
hegemonic discourse and practices, by 
means of the state control over the ‘sacred’, 
of legal statutes and rulings, the discourse 
of “agama” allows the discrimination and 
erasure of religious citizens’ identity, who 
for some reason cannot be integrated into the 
Indonesian political system. Since then, the 
appropriation of “agama” has become one of 
the essential practices of governing citizens 
of the Indonesian state.
We should be able to learn from 
the more democratic states in governing 
religions. We can turn to SlavojZizek. On a 
rare occasion, Zizek wrote “How China Got 
Religion”, making comments on China’s State 
Administration of Religious Affairs Order 
No. 5 concerning the institutionalization 
of management for the reincarnation of 
living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, which 
basically “prohibits Buddhists monks from 
returning from the dead without government 
permission (Zizek, 2007: 27). In an interesting 
statement, Zizek argues that this law mirrors 
the same type of paradox Westerners 
encounter in the liberal West: that religious 
belief, the individual’s innermost matter, is 
regulated by a secular government. Religion, 
all in all, has been usually contained to the 
private sphere; where it infringes on the 
public sphere religion should be ruled and 
policed.
How do the state and Indonesians make 
sense of the idea of religious citizenship, in 
the demarcated spaces of “agama”, “adat”, 
and “kepercayaan”? The question in these 
concluding pages can be formulated as: can 
the discourse of “agama” be disassociated 
from the state when the most favorable 
language employed to generate power 
and authority and a source of legitimacy 
is the language of the sacred? Is it true 
that the discourse of “agama” has created 
a controlling knowledge that generates a 
powerful state? Do we, as citizens, in reality 
lack vocabularies, hence resulting in the 
perpetual eminence of the triadic “agama” 
“adat”, and “kepercayaan” fascism?
Having thus established a general 
understanding of how “agama” has been 
appropriated in Indonesia, I have been 
arguing that we have been given no good 
argument for believing that the discourse 
of “agama” may generate equality for 
Indonesian citizens.  Quite the opposite:  we 
have seen that the discourse of “agama” is 
undemocratic.
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